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ssentially the negotiations will be between the USA, Japan and the European Community (EC) 2. Other industriaiised countries and some developing ones will be involved to varying degrees. Indeed, the roles of the smaller trading partners could be significant, ff only they real,ised as much 3. But the fact rema:ins, ff the big three cannot agree there will be no overall agreement worth mentioning.
The negotiations are being formally launched at a ministerial meeting in Tokyo this =month (September). Nearly two years have e}apsed since tlhe governments ,of the major trading powers undertook a firm commitment, in the Smithsonian Accord, to join in another round of GATT negotiations. 4 What is therefore alarming is that in legal terms the commitment of governments to negoti,ate :is likely to be no stronger after the Tokyo meeting than it was after the settlement of the 1971 monetary crisis.
Franoo-British temporising and continuing monetary turmoil, never mind the debilitating consequences of the Watergate scandal, have combined to forestall progress in the preparations for negotiations. Only by a Brussels stretch of imag:ination can the initial bargaining position of the EC be seen, in the light of the fundamental problems confronting the international trading system, as an expression of constructive interest. 5 And the position of the USA will be held in doubt until President Nixon's Trade Reform Act has been passed by Congress. 6
Differences from Previous GATT Rounds
When the GATT negotiations do begin .in ernest, perhaps well into 1974, little should have been irretrievably lost by the political delays, provided the technical analysis of issues is allowed to proceed. For on this occasion the preparations for negotiations are almost as important as the negotiations themselves. In that sense the negotiations have already begun. It is by the same token though ,that they are expected to take ,a consider~ble while to acquire a momentum of their own. This is because the negotiations as such will be very different from previous GATT rounds.
[] Even on tar, iff, s, ~t was agreed during and after the Kennedy Round marathon that .the traditional mode of negotiation, based on reciprocal barg,aining with "concessions" extended unconditionally to all GATT countries on a most-favoured-nation (MFN) basis, had been played out and would h,ave to be replaced by a new approach. 7 [] T, here will be a second major departure in that the next GATT round wi.II focus ~in a concerted way on non-tariff interventions in international trade. By these are meant a wide variety of government measures which either by design or accident protect or favour domestic producers vis-a-vis foreign suppliers -at the expense of domestic consumers and taxpayers. nor in earlier negotiations ,has any impact been made on the increasing isolation of high-cost farmers :in industrial~ised countries Crom the competition ,of low-cost producers in established agricultural-exporting countries. 9 [] Another important object;lye will be to improve the present arrangements which are meant to provide safegLeards against ".market disruption" caused by sudden surges of imports ,and yet provide security of access for new entpants to markets. 10
Non-tariff Interventions and Safeguards
On non-tariff interventions and "safeguards" it appears that governments are at least on the same wavelength. Major points of controversy arise in both areas. But they are not likely to cause a breakdown in the negotiations.
The former include inter alia quantitative import restrictions and export restraints, customs valuation procedures, industrial standards, official subsi,d'ies and public procurement policies. Since the trade effects of such forms of public assistance are ,difficult, and in many cases impossible, to quantify it is acknowledged that for the ,most part they cannot be modified by reciprocal bargaining, in the way that tariffs have been modified in ,the past. 11 Governments accordingly envisage the principle of reciprocity being satisfied in a broad context. Gi~ven the higlh degree of substitutability among ~he various types of non-tariff protection, negotist~ions on them will have to be cond, ucted over a wide range, although objectives will differ from category to category. Some non-tariff devices could be eliminated altogether. TM It should be possible with others to remove trade-distorting side-effects.
Wi~h many non-tariff interventions, however, only an incremental approach seems feasible, involving Initi,ally an equal commitment by governments to general principles .or rules of international competition, followed by a process of more or less continuous consuffation end nego:tiation on their implementation. Such codes of behaviour might frequently amount to elaborations of existing GATT provisions. Codes have already been drafted on an ad referendum basis on industrial standards and customs valuation procedures. Work on further codes is proceeding.
Achieving the adherence of governments to rules of competition will be no mean task. The EC is worried that the Nixon Administration might not .obtain from Congress sufficient authority to enable the USA to abide by negotiated agreements in the non-tariff field. On the other side American offici,als point out that the Brussels Commission, negotiating on behalf of the EC, does not have an authority to neg,oti,ate on the non-tariff interferences that bother the high-technology industry of the USA, especially p L~blic procurement potircies arid government subsidies. Inrdustri,al policy in the Common Market remains the perogative of national governments.
In fact i.t is ,because non-tariff measures are instruments of industrial policy-some more so than others-that they are said to ,be intractable. But tariffs, too, are instruments of public assistance to industry. In domestic terms, commercial policy is concerned with the industrial structure of countries; internationally, it is concerned with the location of production where there are comparative cost advantages. 13
Adjustment Policies
The purpose of trade liberal~isation is to bring about a better use of resources, both d,omestically and intern,ationally, through greater specialisation on particular industries or on particular product lines within industries. Adjustment to changi,ng market conditions, whether on the demand side or on the supply side, ,is a normal and continuous process in market-economy countries. It mostly takes place without the assistance of governments. But in certain circumstances governments intervene to 'help industries adjust or to alleviate, at any rate, the social consequences of adjustment. Now that tariffs have been reduced to very low nominal levels, and non-tariff barriers are to be ,broached, it is widely ~zrgued that governments should put more emphasis on adjustment assistance. TM If they do not it might be hard to induce support from firms and workers for further trade liberalisation. A ,distinction would need to be ,drawn, maybe in a separate code, between "faiT" adjustment assistance and "unfair" feather-bedding. is Dealing wi,th non-tariff distortions, expanding the use of adjustment assistance and improving che safeguard mechanism are all bound up with one another in discussions on the reform of the GATT system. Governments are generally agreed that temporary safeguard protection against sharp increases in 'import competition should be degressive according to a definite timetable, allied with a complementary programme of adjustment assistance and subject to international surveillance.~6 The EC and the USA apparently favour "escape clause" action being taken on a discriminatory basis where ,only one or a few exporting countries are involved. Japan may use its understandable preference for a non-discriminatory course as a bargaining counter in ensuring that safeguards, while being made more liberally available, are applied under stricter conditions than before. There is a chance, too, that the same conditions might be applied to existing non-tariff devices, notably quantitative import restrictions and export re-,straints.
As governments, then, prepare to negotiate on non-tariff issues, adjustment assistance and safeguards it is curious to find the EC still setting store by tariffs. Japan and the USA have proposed as "a working hypothesis" that customs duties ,on industrial products traded among developed countries shouk:l be substantially eliminated over a ten-year period -with appropriate safeguards and strict provisions for "exceptions". 17
In any attempt to put extant tariffs In perspective it is not enough to stress how tow on average they are nowadays. Averagi'ng tariffs conceals, it is true, the high rates payable on certain products in the American, Japanese and Canadian schedules. And low nominal tariffs, particularly on semimanufactures, can represent high effective levels of protection. More plainly needs to be said.
Disequilibrium and New Monetary Order
Politioal perceptions of economic needs tend inevitably to lag behind reality. Governments appear to be having much difficulty in placing what they perceive as commercial policy problems in an up-to-<late context. For the way a problem is perceived and understood is influenced by past experience. And the policy experience gL~iding governments as they prepare for the coming GATT round derives from years of trading in an international system characterised by acute and growing exchange-rate disequilibrium. It is thus understandable that countries hope, and will probably attempt, to resolve through the negotiations many problems which--alt.hough experienced as trade problems-have been a reflection of exchange-rate disequilibrium that is now being corrected in the freform of the internar monetary system, Flexible exchange rates -fixed but adjustable rather than floating -are being written into the new monetary order. They remove the balanceof-payments rationale for tariff protection. This is not to suggest though that tariffs no longer matter. Tariffs remain a distorting factor in the allocation of resources by affording domestic producers a price premium over foreign producers.
In this respect the tariffs of the EC do not present a serious obstacle to the low-priced (and highquality) exports of Japan or to the high-tech~,ol.ogy exports of the USA. Tokyo and Washington are pressing for the phased e[imination of substantially all tariffs as a means of overcoming the economic and political tensions being generated by the proliferation of the EC's discriminatory tariff arrangements around the Mediterranean, in Africa and even farther away.
Ill-advised European Foreboding
But the prospect of phasing out the EC's common external tariff fitls some Europeans with foreboding. The fear, somewhat ill-defined, is that the Common Market wou,ld fall apart and, of course, that feeling is exploited by others more concerned with maintaining protection.~B If the common external tariff ,however, is ,really a major unifying force in the EC today, it says little for the spirit of European unity about which so much is made. It will say even less if tariff discrimination against the rest of the world is still a major unifying force in ten years time.
Part of the trouble is psychological in that the EC's common external tariff, its commercial agreemanta with ",outside" countries and its common agricultural policy have come to be regarded as symbols of European unity, proof to the world of 18 This "fear" seemed to be expressed in G0nther H a r k o r t, A Concept for an Open World Economy, INTERECONOMICS, Hamburg, No. 4, 1973 the new Europe's virility. Any criticism of these policies, whether from inside or outside the Common Market, 'is interpreted by some as an attack on the Common Market itself. Yet the process of European integration must be pursued in harmony with the i,ntegration of the world economy as a whole :if ,it is not to incur the hostility of countries which happen to ,be Iooa~ed e~sewhere.
Constructive Approach to European Unity
That is the spirit in which the European idea shou}d be pursued .in the 1970s ,and 80s. Policies must adjust to circumstances Which have greatly changed sinoe the 1950s. This means that Europeans must fired a more construotive approach to unRy than what is tantamount, in an age .of increasing ,interdependence, to provoking economic conflict with the rest of the world. Such a Bismarkian approach to unity is someth,ing which Europe is meant to have learnt something a:bout over the last hundred years.
There ,is thus a need in the EC to develop a political consensus on the maintenance of international economic order that is responsive to the issues facing the world economy, Little headway will be made in that direction, however, 'if the Commission persists in its obsessive and unfounded belief that tariff-free trade is impossible unless all conditions of competition are equalised. 19
,No trade can take place if all competitive condit~ons are equalised. This is easily axplained. International trade is based on cost differences. T, here is a wide gulf conceptually between (a) ruling out distortions to competitive conditions ;resulting from government ~irrterverttions, which would come under the heading of one non-tariff me~sure or another, and ('b) ru,ling out differences in competitive conditions resulting from varying taxation, social benefits and company laws. The ,first is a feasible and necessary part of any attempt to liberalise international trade. The second is neit:her feasible nor necessary among countries not aspiring to economic and pal:itical u.nion. =0
